A New Yorker desta semana publicou uma reportagem do Sy Hersh mostrando as mentiras da campanha do Afeganistão e como os erros na estratégia militar comandada pelo Rummy levaram a mais um atoleiro que o exército mais poderoso do mundo tb não deve conseguir sair tão cedo.
Meanwhile, the United States continued to pay off and work closely with local warlords, many of whom were involved in heroin and opium trafficking. Their loyalty was not for sale but for rent. Warlords like Hazrat Ali in eastern Afghanistan, near the Pakistan border, and Mohammed Fahim had been essential to AmericaÂ’s initial military success, and, at first, they had promised to accept Karzai. Hazrat Ali would be one of several commanders later accused of double-crossing American troops in an early, unsuccessful sweep for Al Qaeda, in 2002. Fahim, now the defense minister, is deeply involved in a number of illicit enterprises.
No site da New Yorker há uma entrevista com o Sy comentando a reportagem, Osama, heroína, líderes tribais, etc. O jornalista diz tb como está a moral das tropas americanas no Iraque.
That brings up a larger point. You speak to people at all levels of the military. Should soldiers complain about how they’re used—should soldiers be talking to reporters at all?
Hell, yes. ThereÂ’s no question. We have a strong notion of civilian control, and the officers arenÂ’t inclined to go public, and not just because that would be a career ender. But this is a very unpopular war within the military, much more than any journalist can convey. Still, theyÂ’re professional soldiers and they do their job. I saw it with Vietnam; at a certain point, the war just became so unpopular among the military. And thatÂ’s worth knowing.
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